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Section 27 of the South African (SA) Constitution 
provides that: (i) everyone has the right to have 
access to healthcare services, including reproductive 
health care; and (ii) the state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures – within its available 
resources – to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these 
rights.[1] The provision of medicine and healthcare services plays 
a central role in ensuring that individuals have access to quality 
healthcare. Given that access to effective medicines and quality 
healthcare services underpin this right, great value has been 
attached to health research which is aimed at developing medicines 
and improving such services.[2] The mission statement of the 
national Health Research Policy in SA reflects this by providing 
that the state must ‘promote research that contributes towards the 
improvement of human health and welfare’.[2]
Health research frequently requires the use of human volunteers, 
who may bear some risk in order to generate new knowledge. Their 
interests are often pitted against those of science and broader public 
health goals.[3] As a result, a central concern in the regulation of 
health research is that the interests of society and of science do not 
override the interests of individual research participants.[4]
The issue of the interests of science and society v. those of 
individual research participants recently came before our courts 
in the matter of Venter v Roche Products (Pty) Limited and Others 
(Case No. 12285/08) (hereafter ‘Venter’). In this case, the court had 
to consider whether the plaintiff, Mr Venter, was entitled to claim 
for non-medical costs such as pain and suffering, loss of income and 
general damages, even though the informed-consent document that 
he had signed expressly excluded such claims.[5]
This article sets out the facts, issues and judgment in the case. It 
concludes with a discussion of the implications of the judgment for 
research ethics committees (RECs).
The facts of the case
In 2005, Mr Venter agreed to participate in a study on the safety and 
efficacy of an experimental cancer drug for the treatment of colon, 
breast and lung cancer (paragraphs (paras) 1 and 8 – all paragraph 
numbers refer to the relevant paragraphs in the Venter case). The 
study was a global one sponsored by F Hoffman-La Roche AG 
(FHLR), a Swiss company (para 8). FHLR entered into a written 
agreement with Roche SA to conduct the study on their behalf in SA 
(para 11). Roche SA in turn, entered into a sub-agreement with a Dr 
Raats at GVI Oncology in the Western Cape to act as the principal 
investigator and trial site (para 15).
Regulatory approval for the clinical trial was obtained from the 
Medicines Control Council (MCC) and two RECs, of the University 
of the Witwatersrand and Pharma Ethics (para 12), both of which 
approved the study and the informed-consent document that was to 
be used (para 14).
Mr Venter was invited to participate in the study by a Dr Van der 
Merwe from GVI Oncology. He was given a copy of the informed-
consent document to read at home, and 5 days later Dr Van der 
Merwe went through it with him point by point (para 17). Mr Venter 
thereafter agreed to be a participant in the study and signed the 
consent form (para 17).
The consent document expressly provided that the sponsor, 
FHLR, would pay for the cost of medical treatment directly linked 
to any trial-related injury, and that no other compensation would be 
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available (para 3). Furthermore, any claims for compensation would 
be determined in line with the guidelines issued by the Association 
of British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), on which the SA Good 
Clinical Practice guidelines (GCP) are based (para 3).
Mr Venter subsequently suffered a research-related injury and had 
to be hospitalised (paras 5 and 18). He claimed that he had suffered 
damages as a result of this research-related injury, and instituted a 
civil action against Roche SA and GVI Oncology (para 5).
Issues
Given that the informed-consent document expressly limited 
compensation to medical costs (para 21), in dispute was whether Mr 
Venter was entitled to claim for non-medical costs such as pain and 
suffering, loss of income, and general damages.
Judgment
The first issue before the court was determining whether a tacit 
contract existed between the parties in which it was agreed that 
compensation beyond the stipulated medical costs would be paid in 
the event of a research-related injury (paras 31 - 37). In this instance, 
the court found that there was no tacit agreement between Mr Venter 
and Roche SA on the issue of compensation. This was because: (i) in 
terms of the arrangement between FHLR and Roche SA, FHLR was to 
obtain insurance for the trial – this was in line with clause 4.11 of the 
GCP, which requires the sponsor to pay compensation for any trial-
related injuries; (ii) the informed-consent document provided that 
FHLR, as the sponsor of the trial, was responsible for compensation 
and it could be assumed that the reasonable person in the position 
of the plaintiff would have been aware of this clause before signing; 
(iii) there was no evidence that Dr Van der Merwe or GVI Oncology 
had the authority to conclude a tacit agreement, or that Mr Venter 
intended to conclude a contract with a party not listed on the 
informed-consent form; and (iv) clause 15 of the informed-consent 
form contained an indemnity for GVI, for trial-related injuries (paras 
40 - 42).
The second issue considered by the court was whether the wording 
of the compensation clause in the informed-consent document gave 
rise to a broader obligation to pay compensation beyond medical 
costs (para 43). This part was headed ‘compensation’ and stated that 
FHLR (the sponsor) would pay for the costs of medical treatment 
following a research-related injury. Any compensation provided 
would be determined in terms of the ABPI guidelines, with no other 
compensation being payable (para 44).
Although the court held that the term ‘compensation’ had a broad 
meaning and included compensation for loss suffered as a result 
of a trial-related injury, i.e. damages (para 47 - 48), it found that 
the informed-consent document required any compensation to be 
determined according to the ABPI guidelines (para 53). A review 
of the ABPI guidelines found a recommendation for payment 
without legal commitment, i.e. an ex gratia payment by the sponsor 
and not by the researchers (paras 39 and 58). The court quoted 
with approval the English decision of Morton James Wylie v Dr 
Donald Grosset, Greater Glasgow Health Board (2011), where it was 
held that the ABPI guidelines on compensation were a procedural 
rather than a substantive guide to sponsors (para 61). Based on 
the above, the court concluded that there was no legal obligation 
to pay compensation beyond the medical costs in Mr Venter’s case 
(para 62).
The third issue addressed by the court was whether a stipulato 
alteri (an offer to a third party that comes into effect when the 
agreement is signed) existed (para 66). Mr Venter alleged that, as 
the MCC application stated that all regulatory requirements would 
be met and that the trial would be conducted in accordance with 
the GCP guidelines, there existed a stipulato alteri in favour of the 
trial participants (para 67). The court again rejected this, finding 
that there was no evidence that Mr Venter had either seen the MCC 
application or had intended to accept a third-party offer by signing 
the consent form (para 67).
The fourth issue was whether Roche SA and GVI Oncology 
breached a legal duty that they owed to Mr Venter. The court found 
that there was no evidence that Roche SA and GVI Oncology’s 
failure to include an agreement to provide broader compensation 
was wrongful (para 71). In particular, the court noted that expert 
evidence had indicated that the MCC regularly approved studies 
without such compensation obligations (para 72).
In the light of the above, the court concluded that Mr Venter’s 
application for damages should be dismissed (para 94).
Discussion
The outcome of the Venter matter is important, as it is our first 
judgment on compensation for non-medical injuries following a 
research-related injury. This matter has clarified the approach that 
the courts will take to such disputes by highlighting a number of 
applicable principles. Firstly, the obligation to assess and approve the 
nature of the compensation for research-related injuries falls on the 
regulators reviewing and approving the study. Secondly, participants 
are bound by the express terms of the informed-consent document 
that have been approved by these regulators, and any verbal or tacit 
amendments to such documents would need to be reduced to writing 
if they are to be enforceable.
Both these principles have significant implications with regard to 
the way in which RECs review clinical trials.
Role of RECs in establishing what forms of  
compensation for harm are ethical
The court held that regulatory approval had been obtained from 
the MCC and two ethics committees (para 12). All three regulatory 
bodies had approved the content and wording of the informed-
consent document (para 14). The court appeared to accept that 
limiting compensation in this way was reasonable because, firstly, 
such bodies had the legal authority to approve/not approve research, 
and, secondly, this stance on compensation in this instance reflected 
an accepted practice in the field (para 72).
It is submitted that the court was correct in viewing the 
responsibility to set the normative standards for compensation as 
being in the hands of the regulators. The MCC must ensure that 
clinical trials are scientifically valid and that they comply with certain 
ethical standards such as obtaining consent from participants,[6,7] 
while RECs must grant ethical approval if a protocol is found to 
be ethical.[8] Compensation for research-related harm is clearly 
an ethical issue, which is referred to in both the national ethical 
guidelines[9] and the GCP.[7] This seems to imply that the MCC and 
RECs should ensure that adequate compensation arrangements are in 
place, as part of the assessment of whether health research is ethical.
However, there is limited ethical guidance on this point, and 
possibly there are divergent approaches in practice. Neither the 
national ethical guidelines[9] nor the GCP[7] set a substantive 
standard on compensation for harm. However, the national ethical 
guidelines require arrangements to ‘ensure adequate compensation 
to participants for injury suffered as a result of participation in the 
trial’.[9] These arrangements must be specified in the informed-consent 
document,[9] while the GCP guidelines focus on the procedures and 
substantive standards that should be followed if there is a dispute 
regarding the nature of compensation to be paid.[7]
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This lack of specific ethical guidance on compensation leaves open 
the question of whether limiting compensation to medical costs is 
ethical. The court found that as the regulators had approved the 
study with this specific limitation on the kinds of compensation 
that could be claimed and Mr Venter had agreed to this, he could 
not at a later point argue that the researchers or sponsors had 
acted wrongfully (para 71). This means that RECs must specifically 
consider the issue of the compensation standards when approving 
research as part of their ethical obligation to protect research 
participants and promote their welfare. Furthermore, members 
of RECs should ensure that they carefully consider the express 
wording of the compensation clause and that they are satisfied 
with it if it limits a participant’s rights by excluding certain forms 
of damages. This is because once the informed-consent document 
is approved and consented to by a participant, a participant cannot 
argue later that the researchers or sponsors had acted wrongfully 
(para 71). 
Implications of the express terms of the 
informed-consent document
Our law is clear regarding the obligation to obtain consent from 
research participants. The National Health Act provides that when 
a health service is experimental and is being undertaken at a health 
establishment, there is a duty on that establishment to inform the user 
that the service is a form of research.[8] Researchers are also required 
to inform research volunteers of the ‘objects of the research or 
experimentation and any possible positive or negative consequences 
on his or her health’.[8] With regard to compensation, point 3.5 of the 
GCP provides that the informed-consent document should specify 
the ‘compensation and/or treatment available to the participant in 
the event of trial related injury’.[9] In summary, these norms require 
information on compensation, but do not set a substantive norm on 
what types of compensation should be provided by sponsors.
The court made it clear that it would not recognise terms that were 
not expressly provided for in the informed-consent document. It is 
submitted that this is the correct approach from a public policy point 
of view, and it would be inappropriate if research participants could 
‘negotiate’ alternative conditions under which they would participate 
in a study. Furthermore, the court held that as the defendant, Mr 
Venter, had given informed consent, this excluded wrongfulness, thus 
excluding the possibility of a civil claim.
The above facts and issues considered, it is submitted that RECs 
must ensure that researchers implement an adequate informed-
consent process that brings to the attention of participants the 
distinction between the researchers and sponsors, and the limitation 
of compensation – as defined by the express wording in the consent 
document. Furthermore, informed-consent documents should 
confirm that the participant is aware that any verbal or other changes 
to the content of the signed consent document would only be legally 
binding on the researchers and sponsors if they were reduced to 
writing and brought to the attention of the REC concerned.
Claims in terms of the GCP
It is submitted that the court erred in so far as it viewed the GCP as 
being only procedural in nature and misinterpreted the role of GCP 
norms within the context of the wording of the specific informed-
consent document.
It is considered that the guidance in the GCP is not just 
procedural in nature. Although it does not specifically state what 
forms of damages should be covered by the sponsors of research, 
there are two principles indicating that the drafters intended a 
broader approach. Firstly, they state that sponsors must obtain 
‘comprehensive’ insurance. Secondly, they refer to the need to ensure 
that the amount of compensation will be ‘appropriate to the nature, 
severity and persistence of the injury and should in general terms 
be consistent with the quantum of damages commonly awarded 
for similar injuries by a South African Court in cases where legal 
liability is admitted’.[9] It is argued that these are substantive rather 
than procedural obligations, implying that a broad approach to 
compensation is not excluded.
Finally, it is submitted that the wording of the informed-
consent document indicated that any dispute regarding the 
specified compensation would be determined in terms of the 
ABPI guidelines. This indicates that disputes regarding issues 
such as whether certain medical costs could be covered would be 
resolved by reference to the substantive norms in the GCP – which 
provide that, for example, a participant may only claim for serious 
bodily injury of an ‘enduring character’.[10] It is circular logic to 
state that there is no legal obligation to pay compensation beyond 
that set out in the GCP, as these guidelines provide that the ‘fact 
that a sponsor has agreed to abide by these Guidelines in respect 
of a trial does not affect the right of a participant to pursue a legal 
remedy in respect of injury alleged to have been suffered as a 
result of participation’.[7]
Conclusions
The Venter case has shown that delictual claims for research-related 
injuries will not be successful if the plaintiff has agreed to limit his/
her own rights through signing an informed-consent form that 
limits compensation. This places an important obligation on RECs 
to protect the rights and welfare of research participants by carefully 
reviewing compensation clauses in informed-consent documents. 
The national ethical guidelines require that compensation 
arrangements be ‘adequate’,[9] and in light of this, RECs should 
consider what is just in the circumstances. Is it in fact appropriate 
to limit compensation to medical costs when participants may lose 
earnings and endure pain and suffering and other forms of harm in 
the event of a serious adverse event? RECs are obligated to ensure 
that participants are made aware that if compensation is limited to 
medical costs, they will not be able to claim other delictual damages 
at a later stage.
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